Abstract: A team of Central Europe-based political geographers examines Turkey's bid for European Union (EU) membership, one of the most controversial issues confronting that country's and EU politics. The authors analyze Eurobarometer public opinion survey data on EU enlargement (and particularly Turkey's EU membership) across the 27 polities of the enlarged EU as well as in Turkey itself. The analysis of the data points to clear regional differences in support for Turkey's EU membership. Moreover, the authors' statistical analysis indicates two major components around which public perceptions of Turkey's EU membership coalesce. The first, identified as a "thick" component, based on the idea that EUrope embodies a specific cultural identity, opposes Turkish membership, whereas a second "thin" component, comprised of institutional-procedural norms, leaves the door open to Turkey. They argue that it is at the complex intersection of these two opposing views that Turkey's bid for EU membership should be located and eventually decided. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F500, F530, O180. 2 figures, 7 tables, 45 references.
INTRODUCTION T
he question of Turkey's membership in the European Union (EU) has sparked longlasting debate on the cultural identity of "Europe" and the cultural, political, and economic interests of its member states. Not only is the issue of self-definition of Europe as identified/founded on Christianity being reconsidered, but the dominance of the Christian religion at the level of member states as well as regional and local communities is also placed in question. The issue has become more salient as the EU has advanced from a common market toward an ensemble of states integrating their political and cultural affairs. The issue is interwoven with views of Europeanization and affects the EU in a number of ways. For example, the possible accession of Turkey would imply changing relations of size, power, and socio-economic inequality within an enlarged EU. In the present European confederalconsociational system, in part procedurally based upon population size differences among member states (Rosamond, 2000; Hix, 2005; Dostál, 2010b Dostál, , 2010c , Turkey would displace Germany and other large member states as the largest power in terms of number of qualified majority votes in the Council of Ministers and seats in the European Parliament. Turkey's lower levels of economic performance would also test the socio-economic cohesion regimes of the EU (Molle, 2007; Dostál, 2010a) . These general indicators show that Turkey's bid for EU membership is one of the more controversial challenges confronting the EU today. Among both EUropean political elites and electorates, there are deep-seated concerns about the political, cultural, and economic impacts of Turkish membership, even if Turkey were to meet all of the Copenhagen political and economic criteria for accession. 2 The purpose of this paper is to examine public opinion regarding Turkey's EU membership, both across the 27 current EU member states and within Turkey itself. It also seeks to reveal the images of Europe that emerge when the EU confronts the possible membership of Turkey. The paper is divided into four sections. The first provides a brief overview of the current multi-speed character of EU integration. We argue that the existing macro-geography of differentiated integration of the European space must be considered before claims are advanced that Turkey would endanger this process. Within this context, we identify three modalities through which Turkey might "integrate" into Europe. A second section deals specifically with public opinion survey data for the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] , seeking to illuminate the major cleavages that exist with respect to Turkey's EU membership. The third section analyzes a specific dataset (Eurobarometer 66.1, 2006) , which contains a series of questions related to the conditions that Turkey must satisfy in order to be accepted by the EU. With the help of principal component analysis, two basic orientations are specified, which point respectively to a "thick" idea of Europe articulated in cultural-identity terms (sometimes equated with the notion of "Christian Europe") and a "thin" one that resonates with legalistic principles (e.g., democracy, human rights, and state of law). A concluding section discusses the limits of such dichotomous views, by exposing the internal contradictions of the "thin" principles, which seem unavoidably to confront and be shaped by "thick" reasoning.
MULTI-SPEED INTEGRATION AND THREE OPTIONS
Some scholars commenting on the European integration process have characterized the EU as an "imperial constellation" (Zielonka, 2006; Beck and Grande, 2007) . By examining the process of European integration, it is possible to identify a differentiated geography that manifests a multi-speed or asymmetrical political and economic development process, which today characterizes this spatial constellation. By considering the varying intensity of the integration process and looking at the various institutional and procedural mechanisms that regulate the functioning of the EU (Dostál, 2010b) , one can identify at least six major zones in its institutional macro-geography and outline three possible modalities of Turkish integration into the European space. The zones include: (1) Zone of Deepest Integration, which comprises member states willing to "pioneer" and form a core group in the EU, such as members of the Eurozone and those willing to create a EU common military force; (2) Zone of Intensive Integration, which includes the 27 current member states, linked by their efforts to enhance or "deepen" their common market (the so-called "first pillar" of the EU); 3 (3) Zone of Limited Integration and Cooperation, which also includes the 27 member states and deals with both 2 At the 1993 EU summit in Copenhagen, Denmark, representatives of the then-12 member states agreed that accession could only take place after an associated country was able to assume obligations of membership and satisfy the required economic and political conditions (democracy, civil rights, respect for minorities, and market-oriented economic criteria).
3 It embraces the original scope of the European Economic Community, as well as common policy regimes (e.g., agricultural policy, competition policy, industry, research and development, and environmental and regional policies) over which the EU level retains considerable power and allocates important decision-making powers and financial resources to its governing bodies. the EU's "second" (cooperation in common foreign and security policies) and "third" (cooperation in justice and domestic affairs) pillars; 4 (4) Zone of Extended Power and Influence, which embraces states that have adopted EU rules and participate in a variety of programs without being formal EU members 5 comprising part of a zone of extended EU power and influence; (5) Zone of Candidate Countries, which currently includes Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland, and Turkey, all having concluded association agreements with the EU; and lastly (6) Zone of Countries Involved in the EU Neighborhood Policies, which is the EU's so-called "Near Abroad" and includes all member states of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), namely Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine.
This conceptualization of current multi-speed character of European integration suggests three modalities for Turkey's future EU "integration." The first modality relates to the possible shift of Turkey from the fifth zone of candidate countries to the fourth zone of extended power and influence. Such a shift would recognize Turkey's special relationship with the EU (i.e. "quasi-membership"), thereby avoiding the challenge of accepting Turkey's full EU membership.
An instructive comparison in this regard is with Norway. Elliasen and Sitter (2004) , in proposing the notion of EU "quasi-membership," have claimed that Norway offers a test case for indirect participation in European integration processes. Norway's participation in the EEA is based on the extension of the Single Market Act by the EEA, but also upon ad hoc Norwegian participation in some other EU initiatives, and adaptations and necessary legal adjustments to EU treaties. 6 The EEA agreement pushes Norway in the direction of greater involvement in the EU common market than candidate and associated countries. Norway also is included in the Schengen zone (i.e., the passport-free travel area). Because Norway has had to unilaterally adapt to the EU legal framework and political development, its quasi-membership is obviously asymmetric. Furthermore, Elliasen and Sitter (2004) show that the advantages of quasimembership tend to diminish with each deepening and widening of the EU.
Norway's example illustrates some of the basic asymmetries in Europe's political macrogeography. It also points to the need for a set of integrated policies, to which all EU member states would subscribe, that would provide minimal room of maneuver (particularly in the first and second zones) in order to limit potential centrifugal tendencies in the EU (e.g., Dostál, 2010c) . Yet, at the same time, the fact that certain member states find themselves in this zone of extended power and influence, and are committed to deepening the integration process, resonates with Turkey's possible future integration into multi-speed Europe. However, the modality of quasi-membership resembles too closely the notion of "privileged partnership" advanced for Turkey by Germany's Christian Democratic political elite (Murphy, 2004, p. 586; Aybet, 2006; Schimmelfenning, 2009) , but rejected by the present Turkish government.
The second modality of Turkey's integration in the EU would be a further upgrading of its associated country status, which, however, would continue to confine it to the fifth zone of candidate countries. Proposals to follow this modality have led to vehement Turkish protests in the recent past (Arıkan, 2003) . However, today, due to the diplomatic efforts of Turkey's Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu, alternative foreign policy scenarios that put an emphasis on a greater Turkish regional engagement outside Europe (e.g., see Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011) are gaining strength in Turkey. Oft-quoted concepts such as "zero problem" diplomacy and "maximum cooperation" with Turkey's neighboring countries are attributed to Davutoğlu's new foreign policy approach, signaling a shift from Turkey's unconditional EU quest (Zeynalov, 2010) .
The third and final modality would be the "high route" of full-fledged EU membership within a decade or longer. This is the modality to which the current Turkish government is officially committed, which inevitably requires that Turkey undertake substantial reform and modernization initiatives so as to meet the Copenhagen criteria for accession. Acceding countries must also adopt the full acquis communautaire-the ensemble of rights and obligations that EU countries share-and the EU and Turkey are currently in negotiations over 35 chapters of this document.
Turkey's negotiations, however, seem to be more difficult than those undertaken recently by the 12 candidate countries that acceded during the May 2004 and January 2007 enlargements. The reason, as Barkey and Le Gloannec (2005, p. 131) observe, is increasing opposition by the European public. In 2005, France introduced an amendment to its constitution, making it possible to organize a referendum on accession to the EU by any new country if that country's population represents more than 5 percent of the overall EU population. This maneuver was clearly aimed at Turkey. Although the French later decided to scrap this amendment, in August 2008 Austria discussed the possibility of holding a similar referendum in the event of Turkey's successful accession to the EU. In addition to the possibility of Turkey's accession being put to a public vote, the negotiation process with the EU would in any case be fraught with uncertainty, as Turkey's bid would have to be approved by each EU member country, as well as by the European Parliament. Thus, each member state could readily halt the negotiations or at the least made them quite difficult and protracted.
7 All these circumstances make this modality quite complicated, due to a variety of political and cultural cleavages in the EU. It is clear that evolving domestic situations and public opinions in both Turkey and each EU country are crucial factors that must be considered when assessing the viability of this third modality.
Debates on Turkey's compatibility and suitability for full membership have always been directed to the question of whether Turkey can be considered a European country. Turkish political elites have traditionally based the "European character" of their country on the strong emphasis placed on secular and Westernizing measures adopted since the 1923 foundation of modern Turkey by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his associates (Mango, 2001; Yavuz, 2009 ). The problem of identity is, however, an ambiguous one, presenting difficult issues not only for Europe, which continues to ponder the compatibility of Turkey with European history, values, and identity, but also for Turkey itself. In fact, the legacy of the War of Liberation (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) has created for present-day Turkey a cultural representation of Europe as an enemy or a sinister force threatening to break up Turkish national unity (Helvaçioğlu, 1999) . This representation also has its roots in the "Sèvres complex." To some extent this has already occurred, in the form of Greece's opposition over the Cyprus question (Akcalı, 2009) . 8 The Sèvres Treaty-the peace treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers at the end of World War I-envisaged the partition of the Ottoman Empire among its ethnic communities, with large territorial shares given to the Empire's Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish populations. Although the War of Liberation (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) , led by Atatürk against the Allied Powers, finally prevented the implementation of the Treaty of Sèvres, this has remained one of the most disturbing reference points in Turkish collective memory (Akçali and Perinçek, 2009). In the Cold War context, however, realpolitik led Turkey to side with the Western powers. NATO membership followed in 1952, and a bid for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1959. This latter move was prompted by a similar bid from Greece made only two months earlier (Dinan, 2005) . However, a number of military coups (1960, 1971, and 1980) , 9 and the role of the military in the political and juridical systems of Turkey, strained relations with the EEC (and later its successors, the EC and EU).
Although the collapse of the Soviet Bloc has significantly altered the character of regional security threats, the geostrategic importance of Turkey does not seem to have diminished. On the contrary, its regional security relevance for the EU has increased in the post-Cold War era (Müftüler-Baç, 2000) , which justifies the EU-Turkish rapprochement over the last decade or so. Arıkan (2003, p. 208) , for instance, has argued that Turkey's importance for European security is not only related to its role as a stabilizing factor in the broader regional context, but also to the fact that European security is closely linked to the social, economic, and political stability of Turkey itself. Hence, support for Turkey's EU accession coupled with a strategy of supporting political stability in the country would be the most appropriate policy for the mutual security interest of all parties concerned.
Indeed, ever since Turkey became an official candidate member during the Helsinki Summit in 1999, democratization has gained momentum in the country. EU-driven reforms have positively interacted with domestic developments (Tocci, 2005) . As the Turkish state elite has come under pressure both from the EU and from elements of civil society supported by the EU, two major constitutional amendments and eight legislative packages have been adopted by Parliament between 2001 (Akcalı, 2011 . Furthermore, since 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 10 has held power, signaling a shift toward more pro-EU policies.
11 During the AKP's term, liberal, left-wing, pro-Kurdish, and pro-Islamist civil society forces have found more favorable space and their demands have been increasingly met by political institutions (Secor, 2011) . The AKP, whose founders and majority members have an Islamist background, has also drastically changed Turkey's traditional foreign policy towards Cyprus, giving its full support to the comprehensive plan of the 2004 UN Secretary General for the reunification of the island (despite the opposition of Greek Cypriots).
Despite these reforms, the Turkish public continues to be rather divided on the question of EU membership and the Europeanization process. According to Yavuz (2009) , two opposite mindsets-Eurosceptic and Europhile-presently characterize Turkish society, including the pro-Islamist faction (see also Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011) .
12 He notes (Yavuz, 2009, pp. 212-213 ) that the Eurosceptic position believes that "political reforms have made Turkey and Islamic culture vulnerable to European influence, if not manipulation" and calls for "Turkey to have more political liberties but without 'compromising' its Islamic identity." Furthermore, Europe has a "double standard when it comes to dealing with Muslim issues," and hence "reforms 9 Some historical sources also mention another "post-modern" coup in 1997. On February 28th, 1997, the Turkish military exerted pressure on then-Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamist Refah Partisi (Welfare Party), finally putting an end to his coalition government. Because the government was forced out without the dissolution of the parliament, this event is referred to by Turkish journalistic sources as a "postmodern coup."
10 The Party is variously referred to by its Turkish acronym AKP (Adalet and Kalkınma Partisi) or English acronym (JDP, as in Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011).
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Despite a foreign policy that simultaneously places greater emphasis on engagement with Muslim countries in the Middle East, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia (see Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011) . 12 In their analysis of the attitudes of Turkish political parties toward Europe, Jolly and Oktay (2011) adopt a different categorization. Following Taggart and Szczerbiak (2004) , they refer to "hard Euroskeptics" (those who reject the entire project of European integration) and "soft Euroskeptics" (those who express a contingent or qualified opposition to the EU), and assert that all political parties in Turkey are "soft Euroskeptics," although to varying degree. in the EU towards increased pluralism are not innocent, [but] there is a hidden agenda." The Europhile Islamic mind-set is generally much less sceptical about the EU and domestic measures to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, which are deemed crucial to the democratic and economic transformation of Turkey. Europhiles also believe that free access to ideas and civic associations benefit Turkish society.
According to Yavuz (2009, p. 214) , the majority of Turkey's population continues to support the AKP's EU orientation for a number of reasons. Even if Turkey does not become a full member, they believe the accession process provides a structure by which the government can work to improve civilian-military relations, promote economic stability, expand human rights, and realize the rule of law. In a certain sense, the "journey" may count more than "arrival" at the destination.
PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IN TURKEY
The May 2004 enlargement, to eight post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe and to the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta, and the January 2007 enlargement to the Balkan post-communist countries of Bulgaria and Romania were significant in changing the character of the EU in several respects. Symbolically, the two enlargements marked the end of the Cold War division of Europe and seemed to promise a new wave of democratization and economic development (e.g., see Dinan, 2005 ). Yet the national economies of the new member states were relatively poorer and smaller and, as a consequence, the enlarged EU of 27 member states changed from a compact ensemble of affluent countries into a more diverse club. This should be taken into consideration when analyzing public opinion with regard to further enlargements. According to the most recent Eurobarometer survey (EB 73.4), 13 public opinion in the EU-27 is equally divided between those favoring (44 percent) and opposed (44 percent) to further enlargement, with a relatively small minority undecided (12 percent) (see Table 1 ). 14 However, this equal distribution of public opinion at the EU-27 level masks important regional differences. In fact, Table 1 shows a clear divide between the old EU member states (EU-15) and the new member states (NMS-12) that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. 15 While the former group indeed tends to oppose further enlargement, the latter group supports it. When analyzed at the country level, Austria (72 percent in 2010), Germany (70 percent) and France (67 percent) are the key countries in the EU-15, whose public opinions are most strongly "against" further enlargement. This point is particularly important, because the German and French governments have decisive power in EU politics over any major decision involving the EU's future development (Yılmaz, 2007; Dostál, 2010b) . In the NMS-12, the Czech Republic (45 percent in 2010), Latvia (39 percent) and Slovenia (38 percent) exhibit the greatest opposition toward further EU enlargement. When data are analyzed over time, the general trend, both in the EU-15 and in the NMS-12, points to a constant decline of support for further enlargement, with the only exception being the survey year of 2008. 16 For Turkish respondents, the survey results fail to exhibit a clear trend, which may be a response to the irregular or discontinuous path (fits and starts) of Turkey's EU accession effort, as the hope of future membership has periodically been dampened by the opposition of various member states as well as difficulties embedded in the negotiation process itself (Akçalı, 2011) . Significantly, the lowest support recorded in Turkey is in 2010, which indicates the present disillusionment among Turks about their European future.
When opinions concerning EU enlargement are analyzed in terms of specific countries that are to become new member states, the survey data shows a divide between Western countries on the one hand and Eastern and Balkan countries on the other. Table 2 presents the results for the most recent survey querying respondents about their attitudes toward 16 The 2008 response may reflect in part a view prevailing at the start of the global financial crisis, to the effect that European nations might collectively (under the structure afforded by the EU) weather the effects of the crisis more successfully than if forced to confront them in isolation. This theme of European integration in response to imminent crisis is developed further by Jones et al. (2010) . individual countries. 17 The difference between EU-15 and NMS-12 also is apparent in this case. Although both groups rank the potential candidate countries in the same order of preference, respondents in the NMS-12 are always more supportive than those in the EU-15, as well as more undecided. A clear majority in the EU-15 group support the membership of Norway, Switzerland and Iceland-countries clearly belonging to the Western, Christian, affluent world. Croatia is just on the threshold, whereas all the remaining countries are rejected, with Turkey significantly occupying the lowest position.
The negative perception toward Turkey is also confirmed by the three Eurobarometer surveys that specifically asked a question about Turkey's future EU membership (Table 3) . The divide between the old member countries (EU-15) and the new member states (NMS-12) is once again rather evident. Although in neither of them does an absolute majority supports Turkey's EU membership, the NMS-12 group is generally about 10 percent more supportive than the EU-15 group. The lowest support for Turkey's EU membership was recorded in Austria (average of 8 percent for the three-survey period), followed by Germany (18 percent), Luxembourg (18), France (20) and Greece (24 percent). In the NMS-12, the lowest support was registered in the Republic of Cyprus (17 percent), followed by Estonia (28), Slovakia (31), the Czech Republic (33) and Latvia (33 percent).
Disaggregating the responses in terms of the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, the more recent of the three surveys (EB 69.2) indicated that the highest percentage of people supporting Turkey's EU membership are young (15-24 age cohort) and welleducated (holding a university degree) individuals, who share politically more liberal (leftish) views and reside in urban areas. Conversely, the most numerous respondents opposed to 17 Survey EB69.2, administered in March-May 2008. Turkey's EU membership are those between 55 and 64 years old, who are not poorly, but moderately educated, 18 hold center-right political views and who live in small to mediumsized towns. Gender is not particularly relevant, inasmuch as male respondents are associated with the highest percentage values for both the "for" and "against" answers. Put another way, women (15 percent) are more likely to be undecided on the Turkish issue than men (10 percent). Interestingly, the socio-demographic characteristics of those favoring Turkey's EU membership tend to be the same as those used to statistically explain support for the EU (Gabel, 1988) .
When surveyed about the possible EU membership of their country, the Turkish people express high levels of support.
19 At the individual level, the respondents most supportive of Turkey's EU membership (again based on EB 69.2) are those in the 45-54 year-old cohort, who reside in small or medium-sized towns, hold center-right political views, and have completed high school, although they do not necessarily have a university degree. Conversely, younger respondents of the 15-24 age cohort, residing in large towns and cities, whose political views 18 Leaving school when they were 16 years old (secondary-level education). 19 Data from the Eurobarometer (EB) surveys used in this article do not permit analysis of regional differences among Turkish respondents, but one can refer to major outcomes of surveys carried out independently in Turkey (Çarcoğlu, 2003) . In the latter, some clear socio-spatial patterns emerge. First, strong support for Turkish membership is more likely to exist in the metropolitan provinces of Turkey's largest cities, such as Istanbul. Second, there exists a west-east gradient, indicating increasing opposition as one proceeds eastward across Turkey's provinces. Third, and somewhat in contradiction with this second point, provinces in which the Kurdish minority is present tend to support Turkey's EU membership. Yavuz (2009, p. 14) adds to these regional differences the importance of an emerging Anatolian bourgeoisie with EU ambitions. are leftist, and who have an average education 20 are those who evince the highest "against" percent values. This distribution is somewhat surprising, inasmuch as it diverges both from that of European respondents on the question of Turkey's EU membership and from what other studies have shown in relation to Turkish views (Çarkoğlu, 2003) . Further statistical analysis, possibly on longitudinal data, is therefore needed in order to shed light on this issue. As for gender, even in the case of Turkish respondents, women (20 percent) are much more likely to be undecided than men (8 percent).
Overall, as Table 3 shows, support for Turkey's EU membership has decreased among Turks since 2005, i.e. the year in which negotiations with the EU started. As noted earlier, a similar weakening of support can be identified for EU-15 and NMS-12 respondents. Given that more recent Eurobarometer survey data are not available, it is difficult to affirm a hypothesis that Turkey's difficult EU accession experience has contributed to increasing alienation of the Turkish public over the years. One way to investigate this matter further would be to examine survey data collected for two other questions, concerning, respectively, whether EU membership is a good or bad thing and whether it is beneficial or not for Turkey (see Table 4 ).
The results clearly point to a decline in the positive attitudes held by Turks toward the European Union. Respondents who in 2005 were undecided about whether the EU is good or bad for Turkey, showed more clearly negative attitudes in 2009. Similarly, those who in 2005 thought that Turkey could benefit from EU membership shrank significantly four years later. This may indicate that the resistance of the European side to Turkey's final membership during the period of negotiations was clearly resented by the Turkish public.
However, this trend does not emerge so clearly when another survey series is considered. Over the last few years, a private Turkish survey firm, Infakto Research Workshop, has administered surveys in Turkey on behalf of the International Republican Institute, a 20 Leaving school at 18 years of age. The questions, more specifically, read as follows: "Generally speaking, do you think that Turkey's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad, don't know" (QA8b); "Taking everything into account, would you say that Turkey would benefit or not from being a member of the European Union?" (QA9b). Sources: Compiled by authors from Eurobarometer Surveys EB 63.4 and EB 72.4 (primary survey data).
U.S.-based organization financially supported by the U.S. government that works to promote democracy across the world. Among the questions periodically asked of Turks by Infakto, there is a question related to Turkey's EU membership. Table 5 shows the results for the available survey years.
21 Table 5 suggests that support for Turkey's EU membership had not significantly changed since the time negotiations with the EU started. Only the most recent survey, administered between December 2010 and January 2011, shows a noteworthy decline in support against a rather stable percentage of "don't know" responses.
22 On the basis of these surveys, it is therefore difficult to confirm that the extenuating EU negotiation process and the negative attitudes in some major EU countries (Germany and France, in particular) have significantly impacted the Turkish population's support for their country's EU membership. Similarly, the recent "global financial" crisis that has severely impacted the European economies, but has left Turkey almost unscathed, does not appear to have influenced Turkish public opinion.
Certainly, the more energetic foreign policy conducted under the leadership of the Turkey's Prime Minister Erdoğan, aimed at elevating Turkey's profile as an autonomous international player, well respected on the international stage and particularly in the Middle East, has captured the Turkish population's attention (Davutoğlu, 2008; Zeynalov, 2009; Bilgin and Bilgiç, 2011 ). Yet, it does not seem, thus far at least, that this new profile has translated into a lessened demand for Europe. When asked about reasons for joining the EU, Turks indeed put economic advantages first (49 percent of all respondents in the December 2010/January 2011 Infakto survey). From this perspective, the EU is not as much an identity question for Turkey as Turkey is for the EU. EU membership is not viewed as a means for strengthening Turkey's international standing or reinvigorating its self-esteem. This may explain the seeming disparity in percentage between those who affirm their support for Turkey becoming an EU member state (73 percent in 2005) and those who believe that Turkey's EU membership is a good thing (53 percent in the same year; cf. Tables 3 and 4 ). This apparently contradictory opinion seems to point to the idea that Turkey's EU membership is perceived by the Turkish people as something that may well happen in the future, but they do not necessarily hold a 21 Secondary data related to these surveys are available on the website of the International Republican Institute (http://www.iri.org/countries-and-programs/europe/turkey), whereas primary data can be requested by contacting the Infakto Research Workshop (http://www.infakto.com.tr/). 22 Compared to the Eurobarometer data regarding the same question on Turkey's EU membership, there is a not inconsequential difference in value (8 percentage points) for the survey year 2006. Both Eurobarometer and Infakto utilize similar sampling techniques, using as survey units the NUTS-2 regions (the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics adopted by Eurostat), even though the sampling population of Eurobaromer in Turkey is 1,000 versus 1,500 for Infakto (and 2,000 for the surveys administered in May 2010 and thereafter). Estimated sampling error under the simple random sampling assumption is ±2.18 for the Infakto surveys and ±1.9 for Eurobarometer surveys, both at the 95 percent level of confidence. Both surveys are administered in-person, but while the Infakto survey population is 18 years old and above, Eurobarometer's is 15 years old and above. positive image of Europe and, in any event, Europe is perceived more in utilitarian terms than in terms of a 'good thing' in general.
"THICK" AND "THIN" PERCEPTIONS OF TURKEY ACROSS THE ENLARGED EU-27
In Fall 2005 (EB 64.2) and 2006 (EB 66.1), Turkey's EU membership was the focus of some specific Euro barometer questions. Respondents were asked to indicate whether they "totally agree," "tend to agree," "tend to disagree," or "totally disagree" with the following nine statements: (1) "Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography"; (2) "Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history"; (3) "Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the security in this region"; (4) "Turkey's accession to the EU would favor the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values" (EB 64.2 only); (5) "The cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow it to join the EU"; (6) "Turkey's accession would favor rejuvenating an aging European population"; (7) "Turkey's joining could risk favoring immigration to more developed countries in the EU"; (8) "To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to systematically respect Human Rights"; and (9) "To join the EU in about 10 years, Turkey will have to significantly improve the state of its economy." Table 6 presents the results of both surveys.
Looking at the data for the EU-15 and NMS-12, it is interesting to observe that there is no major variation between the two groups' opinions, for respondents tend to hold rather stable views about Turkey in relation to Europe. Only question 5, addressing whether "cultural differences" between Turkey and the EU are an impediment to its accession, shows an appreciable increase in agreement over time, particularly within the EU-15 group (+6 percentage points), followed by a heightened concern for immigration (+ 3 percentage points) within the same group. Overall, the trend already observed above, namely the more positive attitude of NMS-12 respondents toward Turkey, also clearly emerges from these two surveys. Interestingly, as shown by the difference in "don't know" answers, respondents in the EU-15 seem to be more opinionated than those in the NMS-12. This seems to point to the fact that the issue of Turkey is more central in the former than in the latter group.
Looking at all nine survey items, it is clear that Turkey is generally perceived as more of an issue than an asset in relation to its accession to the EU-once again to a greater extent in the EU-15 than in the NMS-12. According to the respondents of both groups of countries, Turkey's membership would in fact neither help rejuvenate an old European population, nor further security in the region, contrary to scholarly opinion on this latter point, as discussed above. On the contrary, it would risk favoring immigration-an issue increasingly and equally feared by Western, Eastern, and Southern Europeans. A relative majority in both the EU-15 and the NMS-12 also are sceptical about Turkey's EU membership promoting a dialogue between European and Muslim values. If there is one point on which an absolute majority of respondents believe might connect Turkey to Europe, at least partially, it is geography and, at least for a relative majority in the NMS-12, history as well. This latter view is likely influenced by the long history of contacts of the new member countries with the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey (Mango, 2001 ). Yet, this geographical and, to a less extent, historical commonality is overshadowed by overwhelming majorities of people who perceive Turkey 23 Note the higher (62 percent) share of respondents in 2005 (Table 4) indicating that EU membership would "benefit" Turkey than the share (53 percent) believing it would be a "good thing" (the aforementioned 53 percent). The utilitarian factor as a key driver in explaining European support among the Turkish public has been confirmed by statistical analysis (see Kentmen, 2008 as well as Jolly and Oktay, 2011). as a country quite distant from Europe in terms of the protection of human rights (the item on which both EU-15 and NMS-12 respondents agreed the most), economic standing and, more marginally, culture.
24
When the responses are analyzed at the individual-country level, not one single country emerges constantly at the top (or bottom) of the list for all nine survey items. However, the tendency within the EU-15 group is for Greece, followed by Austria, Cyprus, and Germany (but, interestingly, not France) to show the highest negative attitudes toward Turkey's EU membership, whereas Spain and to a lesser extent Portugal, Ireland, and Northern Ireland show the most favorable attitudes. Within the NMS-12, respondents from the Czech Republic, followed by Slovakia and Slovenia, show the most recurrent negative attitudes, whereas Romania is by far the most supportive, followed by Bulgaria.
In some respects, Turkish respondents share the views of many Europeans, although to a lesser or greater degree depending on the extent to which the survey item reveals, respectively, a more negative or more positive assessment of Turkey. Thus, Turkish respondents also believe that Turkey's EU membership would increase the migratory pressure on the most affluent EU countries and that Turkey does have a problem in terms of protection of human rights and economic standing. Yet, they believe this is the case to a lesser degree than do EU respondents. Similarly, Turkish respondents also believe that geography partially unites Turkey to Europe, yet to an even greater extent than Western European believe. As for shared history, once again Turks are more convinced in general that this is the case, even though the cumulative percentage of respondents who agree (49 percent in 2005 and 56 percent in 2006) is not particularly high compared to other survey items. This is also true for the question about "cultural differences" between Turkey and EUrope, in regard to which Turkish respondents are more divided than compared to other survey questions. Although Turks perceive neither history nor culture as obstacles to their integration into Europe, some clear divisions within Turkish society emerge on these topics, confirming the tension between Europhiles and Eurosceptics.
Even if Turkish respondents acknowledge the issues that concern Europeans (immigration, human rights, economic disparity), at the same time they largely agree, contrary to the Europeans, that Turkey's EU membership would definitely benefit Europe in terms of demography (rejuvenation being the survey item with the highest score), security (thus confirming in this case the scholarly perspective discussed above), as well as promoting the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values. In this latter sense, Turks do perceive their country as a sort of bridge between Europe and the larger Middle East, reflecting the geopolitical role often discussed in the literature (Yanık, 2011) . The percentage of "don't know" answers is rather similar to that registered in the NMS-12, yet from 2005 to 2006 Turkish respondents had become more opinionated, increasing the percentage of the cumulative "agree" answer for all the survey items. This shows an increased awareness among Turks of the issues that might prevent their country's accession, but also of the assets that Turkey might bring to an enlarged EU.
Results from the Eurobarometer surveys presented in Table 6 are revealing, not only with respect to the image respondents have of Turkey, but also about the type of Europe they envision. There is already a rich literature on the cultural character and identity of Europe.
25 Within this literature, one of the major source of debate is the "national" or "post-national" character of Europe (Antonsich, 2010 )-i.e., the extent to which Europe might need a common identity built around shared history and culture, or whether the mere functioning of democratic legal institutions and procedural norms might suffice to give Europe a demos. This distinction can also be labeled, respectively, as "thick" and "thin" Europe. Whereas a "thin" Europe would make it possible for Turkey to join the EU as soon as it manages to comply with all the legal requirements of the negotiation process, such membership would be much more problematic in a "thick" Europe.
One way of analyzing further the distinction between "thin" and "thick" Europe as it emerges in public opinion is to run a principal component analysis (Rummel, 1970) on eight of the nine statements/questions concerning Turkey's EU membership (Table 6 ) posed in the EB 66.1 survey to respondents of 29 states, namely EU-15, NMS12, and the two candidate countries, Turkey and Croatia (Table 7) .
The two components together account for 70.66 percent of the total variation specified in the correlation matrix. The first component represents 50.57 percent of the variation, with substantial loadings on seven variables. The second component represents 22.09 percent of variation with substantial loadings on two variables. The structure of the loadings on the first component indicates that this dimension represents correlated statements that depict the "thick" conception of Europe.
26 The highest loading (0.858) represents the opinion that 26 Some of the eight questions/statements were edited/reflected to obtain positive loadings on the dimension. Turkish accession would not strengthen regional security. A similarly high loading (0.853) was obtained for the opinion that cultural differences between Turkey and the EU member states are too significant to allow for its accession. The statements that Turkey does not belong by its geography and history to Europe also load high on this component (0.811 and 0.834, respectively). The statements on rejuvenation of the EU population and immigration have lower, but still significant loadings (0.708 and 0.586). Figure 1 shows considerable divergence in component scores representing the thick perception of Europe. It is not very surprising that Greece (EL), the Republic of Cyprus (CY), and Austria (AT) record the highest scores on this dimension. It is also important to note the relatively high scores of the founding and influential member states of Germany (DE), France (FR), Belgium (BE), and Luxembourg (LU), while the Netherlands (NL) and Italy (IT) have component nearer to the mean. In the group of countries acceding during the 1973 enlargement only Denmark (DK) shows a tendency to perceive Europe in "thick" terms. Spain (ES) and Portugal (PT) have negative component scores as does Sweden (SE). It seems that these polities are therefore able to avoid a strong orientation toward the "thick" perception of Europe.
The thick component scores of the 10 member countries that joined Europe in 2004 exhibit considerable differentiation with respect to Turkish accession. Slovenia (SI) and the Czech Republic (CZ) show levels of thick perception similar to member states in the EU's historical core, as does Finland (FI), thus expressing considerable scepticism about Turkish accession. In contrast, Poland (PL) and Hungary (HU) score clearly on the negative side of the dimension. It seems that these polities emphasize the potential benefits from Turkey's bid for EU membership. Considering the two countries that joined the EU in 2007 (Romania [RO] and Bulgaria [BG] ) and the two candidate countries (Croatia [HR] and Turkey [TR]), it is to be expected that Turkey itself would register the lowest score on the "thick" dimension. The score of Romania, however, is very close to the Turkish one, and Bulgaria as well as Croatia also score on the negative side of this component. This suggests the tendency of these countries to assess Turkey's future full membership in positive terms.
At the individual level, cross tabulations with "cultural differences"-one of the components most clearly associated with the "thick" dimension of Europe-reveal that the highest percentage of respondents who favor the "thick" view of Europe are generally men (female respondents are more undecided) 55-64 years of age, whose political ideas are on the center or center-right of the political spectrum, who live in small or medium-sized urban places and who have an average level of education (leaving school at ages 17-18). To a degree, this distribution is not unexpected, as it reflects respondents who most strongly oppose Turkey's EU membership. The second component represents public opinion that resonates with a "thin" idea of Europe (Fig. 2) . The highest loading (0.907) on this dimension (Table 7) refers to systematic respect for human rights, while the second substantial loading (0.710) refers to the significant improvement of Turkey's economy. It is interesting to note that this latter statement also loads significantly on the first component (0.555). This means that across the set of 29 countries there is also an important tendency of the public to view Turkish accession in instrumental terms (McLaren, 2007) .
It is clear from Figure 2 that Sweden (SE) scores highest on this dimension, followed closely by Finland (FI), Poland (PL), and Slovenia (SI). The very negative score on the dimension of the Republic of Cyprus (CY) clearly indicates scepticism toward the idea of Turkey being able to respect human rights. Greece (EL), somewhat surprisingly, diverges from the Republic of Cyprus on this view, as its score is close to the average for the set of 29 countries. Focusing on the candidate countries, it is interesting to note that Turkey scores on the negative side of the dimension-a position tending to indicate concerns about the EU disciplinizing impacts on Turkey's accession.
At the individual level, cross tabulations with both "human rights" and "economic improvement"-two of the components most clearly associated with a "thin" dimension of Europe-reveal a more complex socio-demographic profile of the respondents holding this view of "thin" Europe. In fact, while the respondent is generally highly educated (holding a university degree) and lives in larger urban settlements, s/he tends to have center-right political views as well as center-left views (in the case of "human rights"), and an age ranging from 25 to 54 years. As for gender, the respondent who privileges a "thin" idea of Europe is generally a man, but once again because more women are undecided. It is interesting to observe, then, that while a "thick" idea of Europe receives the highest support from the type of respondent (conservative, aged, moderately educated, living in small or middle towns) one might expect, it is not the case for the idea of "thin" Europe, which is associated with more mixed socio-demographic characteristics of respondents.
CONCLUSIONS
Turkey's EU membership is rather clearly a contested issue when analyzed from the perspective of European public opinion. Regional differences clearly exist in relation to this matter, as respondents residing in NMS-12 tend to be less hostile than those in EU-15 to the possibility that Turkey one day will join Europe. The very notion of "joining Europe," however, should be problematized, as we have attempted to demonstrate that there is no single path toward integration in the present multi-speed Europe. We have discussed three possible modalities whereby Turkey can still integrate into Europe, although we also have pointed out the limits associated with each. Our argument, however, is that when confronted with the possibility of Turkey's full membership, Europe comes to be constructed in what we have termed "thick" and "thin" terms. A "thick" Europe is built around cultural, historical, and geographical bonds, which would oppose Turkey's EU membership. A "thin" Europe, instead, is one built on the normative-legalistic framework of the acquis communautaire, as well as on utilitarian economic principles. Within this perspective, Turkey could have the chance to join Europe as long as it manages to implement and abide by the acquis communautaire. Given that the multi-speed character of European integration complicates and yet also erases cultural and historical divisions, this second perspective should be the more likely. Diez (2011) advocates letting both sides negotiate within the established routines, rules, and procedures of the enlargement processes as the best way out of the EU-Turkey conundrum.
In such a process, Turkey might be able to overcome the opposition of European countries to its membership to the extent that it simply follows the fundamental norms of the EU. However, our analysis of survey data reveals an entrenched popular hostility to Turkey's future EU membership, and it is difficult to see how national governments would be able to make a decision that would contrast so openly with the views of their electorates. Results from EB 69.2 (QA45), administered in 2008 are illuminating. Even if Turkey complies with all conditions set by the EU, as many as 78, 63, and 61 percent of the Austrian, German, and French respondents, respectively, would oppose Turkey's EU membership. This clearly points to the relevance of the "thick" dimension, which cannot simply be dismissed by privileging a "thin" logic. This "thick" component indeed elicits an identity question, which is difficult to overcome. Accordingly, the widespread image among the European public is one of Turkey not "being" European, but potentially "becoming" European (Diez, 2011) . Within this context, "thin" logic alone would not be sufficient to bring Turkey into Europe. It is for this reason that we believe that Turkey's bid for EU membership should be located and eventually decided at the complex intersection of these two opposing views of "thick" and "thin" Europe.
